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This paper analyzes the economics of the private equity fund compensation. We build a novel model
to estimate the expected revenue to fund managers as a function of their investor contracts. In particular,
we evaluate the present value of the fair-value test (FVT) carried interest scheme, which is one of
the most common profit-sharing arrangements observed in practice. We extend the simulation model
developed in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) and compare the relative values of the FVT carry scheme
to other benchmark carry schemes. We find that the FVT carry scheme is substantially more valuable
to the fund managers than other commonly observed (and more conservative) carry schemes, largely
due to the early timing of carry compensation that frequently occurs under the FVT scheme. Interestingly,
conditional on having an FVT carry scheme, fund managers’ incremental gains from inflating the reported
values of the funds’ un- exited portfolio companies would be negligible.
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1.  Introduction 
Private equity funds are typically organized as limited partnerships, with private equity 
firms serving as general partners (GPs) of the funds and investors providing capital as limited 
partners  (LPs).  These  partnerships  usually  last  for  ten  years,  and  partnership  agreements 
(investor contracts) signed at the funds’ inceptions clearly define the expected GP compensation. 
Since the payments to GPs can account for a significant portion of the total cash flows of the 
fund, the fund fee structure is a critical determinant of the expected net fund returns that the LPs 
receive. Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) estimate the expected present value of the compensation to 
GPs as a function of the fee structure specified in investor contracts, but do not consider the fair-
value test (FVT) scheme, which is a commonly used carried interest scheme in practice.
1  In this 
paper,  we  evaluate  the  present  value  of  the  FVT  carried  interest  scheme  by  extending  the 
simulation model developed in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), and compare the relative values of 
the FVT carry scheme to other benchmark carry schemes. 
The FVT carried interest scheme allows early carry payments before the fund’s carry 
basis has been returned to investors if certain conditions are met. The FVT scheme is almost 
always accompanied by a clawback provision (see Section 2.6 for definitions); thus, the final 
nominal amount of carry for the fund’s lifetime is unchanged whether the fund uses an FVT 
scheme or a more conservative carry timing scheme, holding all other fund terms (such as carry % 
level) equal. In other words, the main impact of the FVT scheme derives from the time value of 
money.     
The conditions for the FVT scheme are twofold. First, upon any exit, the cost bases of 
all exited or written-off companies to date must be returned to LPs before any distribution to GPs. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
!" DowJones (2007).     $"
In addition, the distribution to GPs is made only if the sum of the fair values of all un-exited (i.e., 
remaining) companies under management at the time of the exit equals or exceeds a threshold 
value, defined as a multiple of the total cost bases of un-exited investments with the most typical 
multiple being 1.2 (120%). The fair values of remaining investments cannot be easily marked to 
market since these private equity investments are illiquid by nature; in practice, estimate values 
that are reported by GPs are used. Since GPs are thought to possess an information advantage 
over LPs as insiders, the information asymmetry between them gives rise to a potential agency 
problem  when  GPs  use  self-reported  portfolio  values  to  calculate  their  carried  interest.  We 
investigate whether GPs are tempted to inflate the portfolio values of un-exited companies by 
examining the effects of inflated values on the expected PV of GP compensation. 
  In  our  analyses,  we  extend  the  model  employed  in Metrick  and  Yasuda  (2010a)  by 
mapping the exit timing and exit values of portfolio investments as well as the interim values of 
un-exited  investments  into  the  timing  and  amount  of  GP  carry  according  to  the  FVT  carry 
scheme. We obtain detailed information on the terms and conditions for fair-value tests used in 
practice from a large anonymous investor who also provided other information for the analyses 
in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a). We match the parameter values of our FVT model to the values 
most commonly used in these actual funds. We then compare the expected GP compensation of 
the fund with an FVT carry scheme to those of two other benchmark funds.   
Our findings generally indicate that the FVT carry scheme is substantially more valuable 
to the fund managers than other commonly observed (and more conservative) carry schemes, but 
interestingly, conditional on having an FVT carry scheme, fund managers’ incremental gains 
from  inflating  the  reported  values  of  the  funds’  un-exited  portfolio  companies  would  be 
negligible.     %"
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe a model of 
private equity fund compensation in a risk-neutral pricing framework. In section 3, we report the 
model outputs as a function of various input values. We conclude in section 4. 
 
2.  A Model of Private Equity Fund Compensation 
  Payments to GPs running private equity funds consist of management fees and carried 
interest  for  VC  funds;  for  BO  funds,  there  are  additional  fees  called  transaction  fees  and 
monitoring  fees.  While  management  fees  are  based  on  the  cost  bases  of  fund  portfolio 
investments (and/or the fund size), the amount of carried interest (= carry) received by GPs is 
based in general on the timing and exit values of portfolio companies and thus is sensitive to 
fund performance. In the FVT carry scheme, the timing and amount of GP carry also depend on 
the interim values of un-exited portfolio companies.   
In this section, we describe a risk-neutral valuation method for the estimation of the PV 
of carry starting with the determination of the initial investment value of a portfolio company. 
We then specify the dynamics of the company value during the holding period, the stochastic 
exit time point, and the values of exited and all other un-exited investments in the fund portfolio 
at every exit time point. We finally apply various functions that correspond to specific profit 
sharing rules by mapping the exit (and interim) values of portfolio companies to the amount of 
GP carry. 
 
2.1 Risk-neutral valuation 
The  estimation  of  the  present  value  of  GP  carry  for  a  VC/PE  fund  is  complicated 
because  appropriate  discount  rates  are  hard  to  estimate  empirically.  Since  investments  are   &"
illiquid and individual project returns are not fully realized until the end of the fund life—usually 
ten years—it is not easy to measure risk (“beta”) at the fund level using standard time-series 
correlations with the market and other factor returns. Many of the studies that employ fund-level 
cash flow data make an effective assumption that market beta for the asset class is equal to one.
2 
In  this  analysis,  we  take  a  risk-neutral  valuation  approach  and  build  a  simulation  model  to 
overcome this data problem while matching parameter values of the simulation model to those 
that are supported by empirical evidence wherever estimates are available.
3 
 
2.2 Initial investment values   
Since GPs receive a stream of semi-fixed compensation through management fees and 
these fees come out of committed capital, the investment capital that can be used for investments 
is always less than the committed capital that is provided by LPs. Since a minimum necessary 
condition for any type of equilibrium should state that at least the committed capital be returned 
to  LPs  in  expectation,  GPs  must  somehow  create  values  to  reconcile  the  gap  between  the 
investment capital and the committed capital. For example, the value creation may come from 
the possibility that GPs make a lucrative purchase at a low price, and/or from the possibility that 
GPs has a special skill to improve the value of the firm over time.   
We assume a fixed amount of value creation by GPs in each investment, following 
Metrick and Yasuda (2010a). We set this value such that a fund with $100 of committed capital 
would have a total initial value of investments at $106.71. This number is chosen so that the 
expected value to LPs is exactly equal to committed capital for our benchmark VC fund (Fund I 
as described in Section 2.6). That is, for every $100 in committed capital, the LPs pay some 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
2  See Section 4.1 of Metrick and Yasuda (2011) and the citations therein.     
3  See Section 2.2 of Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) for more detailed discussions.     '"
amount in management fees and the GPs then create value (after which the portfolio is worth 
$106.71 in present value) and take out another expected amount in carried interest, after which 
exactly $100 in expectation is left over for the LPs. Then, given this initial investment value, we 
simulate  the  value  paths  for  individual  investments  by  assuming  stochastic  processes  as 
described in the following section. 
   
2.3 The dynamics of the value of a portfolio company 
Let  Xt
i  be  the  market  value  of  portfolio  company    i     at  time  t.  It  is  assumed  to 
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where  S   is the risk-free rate and  !   is the volatility of the investment. Note that  Wt
i  and  Wt
F
are  standard  Brownian  motions,  which  are  mutually  independent  where  Wt
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F
  is common across portfolio companies. By assuming the diffusion 
process as such,  !   captures the correlation between the values of a portfolio company and the 
common  factor.  We  further  assume  that  Wt
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corr dlnXt
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2.
4 
It is important to note that the process is not for the intrinsic value of a company, but for 
its market value. The intrinsic value of an illiquid asset is generally different from its market 
value that would be appraised once it becomes tradable. However, the carry distributions to GPs 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
4  This correlation structure in a stochastic process is widely used in credit risk management and commonly known 
as one-factor Gaussian copula (see, e.g., Briys and De Varenne (1997), Duffie and Singleton (2003), Hull (2007), 
and Schonbucher (2003)).     ("
could occur only when a fund makes any exit after which the exited company becomes less 
illiquid. For this reason, we assume that the proceeds from an exited company at any exit are 
equivalent to its market value while ignoring some frictions.
5  It is also important to note that this 
assumption makes our risk-neutral valuation method consistent. Although the interim values of 
un-exited companies under management might not be close to the market values, the interim 
values are not correlated with the exited values in our model, so the assumption of the market 
value for un-exited companies is not inconsistent with the risk-neutral valuation. 
 
2.4 Random investment duration and random exit time 
 
Random investment duration 
Let    be  the  investment  duration  for  portfolio  company  i.  We  specify  J E   as  a 
random variable that follows an exponential distribution with the instantaneous hazard rate of  !  
as follows:   

  	  
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J # #                   (2)
 
This distributional assumption is based on the observation that, in practice, neither LPs 
nor  GPs  control  the  exit  timing;  rather,  exit  opportunities  arrive  more  or  less  exogenously. 
Furthermore,    is  assumed  to  be  independent  of  the  company  value.  While  this  second 
assumption is certainly false, it is computationally expensive to handle these correlations on 
large portfolios, and in robustness checks using small portfolios we have not found any clear 
pattern between correlation structures and expected carried interest.   
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
&" A majority of exits are made through IPOs or sales to other companies. While the proceeds from an exit may be 
different from the market value, for the purpose of our analysis we ignore these differences. In the case of IPOs, the 
difference may come from the total direct costs (see Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996)) and the underpricing 
of IPOs. 
J E
J E  )"
For the baseline model, we use the exit rate of 20% (an inverse of 5) since the average 
holding period for early VC investments is about 5 years.
6   
 
Random exit time 
Private equity funds may invest in a portfolio company at any time during the fund’s 
investment period, which typically lasts for 5 years starting from its inception. Denote the time 
point  of  an  investment  in  a  portfolio  company  i   by  si .  In  our  simulation  model, is 
deterministic and is set to match the average investment pace that is empirically observed in the 
data (see Section 2.7 for details). Then, the exit time point  ti  for portfolio company  i  is the 
sum of  si   and  di, which is again a random variable.   
 
2.5 Fair value and exit value 
The fair value of a managed portfolio is the sum of the fair values of individual portfolio 
companies under management. At time  t , portfolio company  i  is under management if and 
only if  si !t <ti. Given the diffusion process (1), the fair value of portfolio company i (FV
t
i) 
follows a log-normal distribution: 
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Similarly,  the  exit  value  of  portfolio  company  i  (EV
ti
i)  at  its  exit  J U   follows  a  log-normal 
distribution: 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
6  See Metrick and Yasuda (2010b).   
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2.6 Mapping to carry amount 
In our analysis, we evaluate the PV of carry for a fund with the FVT carry scheme along with 
two  other  funds  with  commonly  used  carry  rules  (benchmark  funds)  and  compare  them. 
Following Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), we choose the most typical carry scheme for VC and 
BO funds, respectively (Fund I), and also the simple carry scheme that does not allow early carry 
timing (Fund II) as the benchmark funds. Fund III is the FVT fund, as described below:   
 
Fund I: The fund with no or 8% hurdle, contributed capital returned first, with clawback 
The carry rule for this fund requires that, upon any exit, LPs must have received cumulative exit 
distributions equal to the contributed capital (= cost bases of all investments made to date + 
cumulative  management  fees  paid  to  date),  plus  any  hurdle  return  (if  any),  before  any 
distribution of carried interests to GPs is allowed. Note that the calculation of contributed capital 
is at the aggregate fund level, not at the deal level. Thus this amount starts small at the beginning 
of a fund’s life, and eventually converges to the committed capital at the end of its life for a fully 
invested fund. This carry rule with no hurdle is the most popular carry rule for VC funds; for BO 
funds,  this  carry  rule  with  an  8%  hurdle  rate  with  a  (100%)  catch-up  is  most  commonly 
employed.
7  The main reason for its popularity is that it allows GPs opportunities to earn carry 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
7  A hurdle rate (also known as preferred return) is quite popular among BO funds; it is less popular among VC 
funds. The catch-up feature is almost always present in funds with hurdle rate. This feature allows GPs to receive   !+"
early  on  in  the  fund’s  life.  However,  since  the  contributed  capital  changes  over  time,  it  is 
possible for a fund with this carry rule to overpay carry to GPs (for example, if the fund does 
well early on and then falters). The clawback provision requires GPs in such instances to return 
the overpaid portion of their carry at the end of the fund life. 
 
Fund II: The fund with committed capital returned first   
The fund with this carry rule requires that, upon any exit, LPs must have received cumulative 
exit distributions equal to the committed capital before any distribution of carried interest to GPs 
is allowed. Note that, this carry rule employs a stricter notion of “fund profitability” than Fund I, 
and as a result carry timing is delayed. It rules out possibilities of carry overpayment to GPs by 
ensuring that the LPs get paid the entire carry basis (= committed capital) before any carry is 
distributed to GPs. While it is the least GP-friendly type of carry rule, it is found in about a 
quarter of the VC fund data used in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), and is a useful benchmark case.   
 
Fund III: The fund with a fair-value test, with clawback 
The fund with this carry rule requires that, upon any exit, (i) LPs must have first received the 
cost basis of all exited (and written off) companies to date plus prorated management fees and (ii) 
the fair-value test (FVT) is met before any distribution of carried interest to GPs is allowed. The 
fair-value test requires that the fair value (= estimated, reported value) of the remaining fund 
portfolio  companies  equals  or  exceeds  a  preset  threshold  amount.  The  threshold  amount  is 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""" "
disproportionate amounts of exit distributions after the fund distributes the required hurdle returns to LPs until GPs 
“catch up” with LPs. With the catch-up feature in place, the hurdle return affects carry timing but not the final carry 
amount as long as the overall fund return is equal to or above the hurdle rate; if the fund return is below the hurdle 
rate, then the carry amount is also affected. See Metrick Yasuda (2010a, b) for more detailed explanations and 
examples.       !!"
calculated as a fixed percentage of the cost basis of all un-exited investments, and a typical 
percentage is in the neighborhood of 120%. If the first criterion is met but there is a small deficit 
between the fair value of the remaining fund portfolio and the threshold value, the remaining exit 
value can be used to pay down the deficit so that the FVT is met, and any leftover exit value can 
then be split between GPs and LPs according to the carry level (e.g., 20:80 for a 20% carry). 
Like Fund I, this type of carry rule is designed to allow GPs to earn carry early in the fund’s life. 
Consequently, this carry rule is also susceptible to potential carry overpayment. If the GPs are 
found to be overpaid carry at the end of the fund’s life, the clawback provision requires that GPs 
return the overpaid portion of the carry payment to LPs.   
Note that, according to a survey on fees and carried interest (DowJones (2007)), the 
majority of respondent funds require the return of only a portion of contributed capital before 
carry  kicks  in,  suggesting  that  the  first  part  of  the  FVT  scheme  is  commonly  practiced.   
Furthermore, the second part of the FVT scheme (the fair-value test) is also employed by about a 
fifth of the survey respondent funds (21.2% of VC funds and 14.0% of BO funds). However, the 
same survey also indicates that there are concerns among LPs that “GPs who tie the timing of 
carried interest to [fair-value] tests might have an incentive to report higher valuations than other 
GPs.” To the best of our knowledge, the effects of having this type of carry rule on (i) the value 
of GP compensation and (ii) GP incentives to inflate the value of unexited company portfolios 
have not been examined before. Our paper sheds light on both of these questions.     
   
2.7 Simulation 
"
Assessing the present value of a GP carry scheme is analogous to pricing a basket call option.   !#"
Although a basket option can be priced approximately in a closed form,
8  the evaluation of a GP 
carry scheme is more complicated because (1) the number of assets in the portfolio changes over 
time, and (2) the strike price also fluctuates during the fund life for some of the carry schemes. 
Thus, we use the Monte Carlo simulation method and compute the PV of carry numerically. To 
analyze  the  GP  carry  as  a  function  of  the  value  paths  of  portfolio  companies,  we  further 
parameterize the baseline model as follows:   
(1) The fund makes a predetermined number of investments with equal sizes. PE funds often 
have covenant provisions that prohibit GPs from investing a large portion of the fund’s 
capital in a single investment, thereby ensuring that the fund capital is diversified across 
investments (Metrick and Yasuda (2010b)). The number of investments in a fund is set to 
match the median value of the fund sample used in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) — 25 
for VC funds and 11 for BO funds.   
(2) Investments are made at the beginning of each calendar year during the first 5 years. The 
investment pace is set to match the empirically observed average pace used in Metrick 
and Yasuda (2010a) — 8, 6, 7, 3, 1 for VC funds, and 3, 3, 3, 1, 1 for BO funds.   
(3) The annual exit probability (20%) is set to match the inverse of the average holding 
period (5 years), as in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a).   
(4) Any remaining investments not yet exited are (forced to be) liquidated at the end of the 
12
th year from its inception. This cutoff date is based on the observation that a fund 
commonly lasts for 10 years and there is frequently a provision in the fund partnership 
agreement  that  allows  up  to  two  consecutive  one-year  extensions  on  the  fund’s  life 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
8  A basket option is an option on a portfolio of assets with a predetermined strike price. A basket option can be 
priced only approximately in a closed form. See Gentle (1993) and Huynh (1994) for lognormal approximations and 
Milevsky and Posner (1998) for a reciprocal Gamma approximation.   !$"
subject to LP approval.     
(5) For  the  BO  fund  model,  we  extend  the  VC  fund  model  with  additional  structures 
pertaining to (i) leverage, (ii) transaction fees, and (iii) monitoring fees. Each individual 
BO fund investment is leveraged with 2:1 leverage ratio; thus, the transaction price for 
each investment is three times the equity investment in the firm by the BO fund. Entry 
transaction fees are charged to the portfolio company at the time of the initial investment 
by the BO fund and the fees are then split 50:50 between LPs and GPs. We set the entry 
transaction fees to match the empirical average of 1.37% of firm value, as in Metrick and 
Yasuda (2010a). Monitoring fees are set to be 2% of EBITDA, or 0.4% of firm value per 
year for a firm with an EBITDA multiple of five, with a five-year contract. These fees 
are assessed (as 0.4%*5 years = 2% of firm value) at exit, and then split 80:20 between 
LPs and GPs. Note that leverage has direct impacts on the transaction and monitoring 
fees, since these fees are charged as percentages of the total firm value, as opposed to 
just the equity value. Furthermore, both transaction fees and monitoring fees paid to LPs 
are used to pay down the carry basis; thus, these fees affect the timing and amounts of 
carry for BO funds, and thus are integral parts of our simulation model.   
 
Under these assumptions, we make 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations and obtain the average of 
GP carry.   
 
3.  Model Outputs 
3.1 Baseline Results 
We first report the results of our baseline model, using the parameter values as described   !%"
in the first vertical panel of Table 1. The parameter values for the baseline VC (BO) model are: 
20% exit probability, 20% carry level, $100 carry basis (= committed capital), 90% (60%) total 
volatilities,  50%  (20%)  pairwise  correlation,  and  120%  fair-value  threshold  level  (plus  2:1 
leverage ratio for the BO model). Table 2 presents the simulation results. Panel A presents the 
PV of carry per $100 of committed capital for VC funds; Panel B presents the results for BO 
funds. For the VC fund with a 120% fair-value test and clawback, the PV of carry is $9.42. This 
compares quite favorably to the two benchmark VC funds: the fund with contributed capital 
returned  first,  with  clawback,  has  the  expected  PV  of  carry  of  $8.67,  while  the  fund  with 
committed capital returned first has the PV of carry of only $8.61.    Thus, our baseline model 
analysis indicates that the FVT scheme is quite GP friendly for VC funds.   
The BO model results are qualitatively similar. The PV of carry for the BO fund with a 
120% FVT is $6.18. The low value in comparison to the VC fund is due to the differences in 
underlying  parameter  values,  in  particular  the  lower  volatility  (60%  vs.  90%)  for  individual 
investments and also the lower pairwise correlation (20% vs. 50%) between investments. More 
importantly, the relative GP friendliness of the FVT scheme remains unchanged: the BO fund 
with contributed capital plus 8% hurdle returned first, with clawback, has the expected PV of 
carry of $5.04, which is a lot lower than the FVT fund expected carry of $6.18. The 8% hurdle 
delays the carry timing, which hurts the PV of GP carry and makes this fund term less GP 
friendly than the other two. The BO fund with committed capital returned first has the expected 
PV of carry of $5.53, which is also significantly smaller than the FVT fund carry.   
 
3.2 Effect of early timing advantage of the FVT scheme on PV of carry   
The baseline analysis indicates that, while the FVT scheme is the most GP friendly for   !&"
both the VC and BO funds, it particularly favors GPs of funds with high-volatility investment 
portfolios, such as early-stage VC funds. This is because high volatility makes it more likely that 
GPs earn early carry; conditional on getting carry early, the high volatility also makes such carry 
larger in expectation. Note, however, that the FVT fund we examine in the analysis above, as 
well as virtually all funds observed in practice, come with the clawback provision, so that the 
nominal amount of carry net of clawback at the end of the fund’s life is the same across all three 
funds. The clawback provision requires GPs to return any excess carry payment at the end of 
fund life, when all three funds are required to have returned to LPs exit distributions equal to 
committed  capital  (because  the  contributed  capital  converges  to  committed  capital  for  fully-
invested,  completed  funds).  Thus,  the  difference  in  PV  of  carry  across  three  funds  derives 
entirely from the time value of money, or the discount rate. In other words, the FVT scheme is 
GP friendly because of its carry timing advantage, not because it entitles GPs to more carry in 
expectation.   
To illustrate this point, we simulate and present the VC model results with different 
values of risk-free rate in Table 3. For the two funds with early carry possibilities and clawback, 
we further break down the results into (i) the PV of carry before clawback, (ii) the clawback 
amount, and (iii) the PV of carry after clawback. With 0% risk-free rate (as shown in the last 
column), the amounts of GP carries net of clawback are identical across the three funds ($8.49), 
since the excess early carry is exactly offset by the clawback amount. Note that the FVT fund has 
a clawback amount ($1.48) that is ten times as large as the fund with contributed capital returned 
first ($0.14). When the risk-free rate (which is the discount rate in the risk-neutral world) is 
positive, this large early carry gives the FVT carry scheme (Fund III) a larger PV of carry than 
the other two. Furthermore, while the fund with the contributed capital returned first (Fund II)   !'"
also earns a larger PV of carry than Fund I when the risk-free rate is positive, the impact of 
increasing risk-free rates is more pronounced for the FVT fund. Thus the present value of GP 
carry in Fund III is more sensitive to risk-free rate increases than that in Fund I.   
 
3.3 Effect of inflation of un-exited investment values 
Next we investigate whether GPs are tempted to inflate the portfolio values of un-
exited companies. As mentioned earlier, there are concerns among LPs that “GPs who tie the 
timing of carried interest to [fair-value] tests might have an incentive to report higher valuations 
than other GPs.” Yet it is also plausible that having some kind of FVT is better than not requiring 
any FVT threshold at all (effectively setting the FVT threshold at 0%) even in the presence of 
asymmetric information. Table 4 examines the effects of inflated values of un-exited portfolios 
on the GP compensation. The benchmark case of 100% is the case in which the market values 
are accurately appraised and self-reported by GPs. Relative to the benchmark case, the present 
value of GP carry before clawback increases slightly with the inflated level of 125% from $10.25 
to $10.40, and increases further but only marginally with the level of 150% from $10.40 to 
$10.48. However, note that the clawback condition kicks in and offsets much of these increases. 
As  expected,  the  amount  of  clawback  is  bigger  with  a  higher  inflated  level  for  un-exited 
investments. With this offset, the PV of carry net of clawback is affected only moderately when 
GPs inflate the value of their un-exited investments, where the minor increases (from $9.42 at 
100% to $9.51 at 150%) come from the time value of early carry. These increases amount to less 
1% of the total PV of carry. The results are qualitatively similar for BO funds (presented in Panel 
B), though we note that the increases are proportionately larger; the increase from $6.18 (at 
100%) to $6.34 (150%) represents 2.6% of the total PV of carry ($6.18). Thus, we find that,   !("
conditional on having the FVT carry scheme, GPs make only negligible amounts of gains by 
inflating  the  values  of  their  un-exited  portfolios,  suggesting  that  the  LPs’  concerns  are  not 
warranted.   
 
3.4 Effect of other parameter values 
We examine the effects of altering various parameter values on the present value of GP 
compensation  across  the  three  funds  to  investigate  whether  these  effects  are  more  or  less 
substantial for Fund III that applies the FVT. We examine the effects on carry of perturbing six 
(seven  for  BO)  model  parameter  values  —  exit  probabilities,  carry  levels,  carry  basis,  total 
volatilities  of  companies,  pairwise  correlations  between  portfolio  companies,  and  fair-value 
threshold levels (plus leverage for BO funds). 
Table 5 presents the effects of altering parameter values on PV of carry for the three 
funds. The parameter values for the baseline VC (BO) model are: 20% exit probability, 20% 
carry  level,  $100  carry  basis  (=  committed  capital),  90%  (60%)  total  volatility,  50%  (20%) 
pairwise correlation, and 120% fair-value threshold level (plus 2:1 leverage for BO funds). We 
perturb these values as described in the second vertical panel of Table 1. Panel A of Table 5 
presents  the  results  for  VC  funds;  Panel  B  presents  the  results  for  BO  funds.  The  exit 
probabilities have negative effects on the present values of GP carry in a concave way across the 
three levels of 10%, 20%, and 30%. The carry levels have positive effects in a concave way 
across the three levels of 20%, 25%, and 30%, but the concavity is quite negligible. When the 
carry basis changes to the investment capital of $82 ($88 for BO funds),
9  the magnitude and the 
percentage of the increases in the value is the largest for Fund III, and the smallest for Fund II.   
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
9  The investment capital level is set to match the empirically observed average fund terms, as in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a). 
The BO fund has larger investment capital than the VC fund because BO funds on average charge lower management fees.     !)"
As expected, increases in either the volatility of an individual company or the pairwise 
correlation lead to higher compensation to GPs. However, given the levels of GP carry, the 
effects of either volatility or pairwise correlation are about the same across the three funds for 
VC; for the BO, the impact is larger for Fund I, because this fund has to meet the 8% hurdle rate. 
Also as expected, the FVT threshold level has a negative effect on the present value of GP carry. 
Finally, the leverage has a negative effect on the PV of carry for BO funds. Though this may be 
surprising, note that the total expected compensation to GPs, which includes transaction fees and 
monitoring fees, rise with higher leverage.
10  Both the transaction fees and monitoring fees are 
assessed on the total firm value, which become larger relative to the size of the BO fund’s equity 
investment when leverage is higher. Entry transaction fees reduce the initial value of equity 
investments, while the exit monitoring fees reduce the amount of exit value to be split between 
LPs and GPs. Both of these effects reduce the amount of carry that GPs receive in expectation, 
while sharply increasing the transaction and monitoring fees that GPs and LPs share. The impact 
of leverage on PV of carry is quantitatively similar across the three funds examined.   
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the economics of the private equity fund compensation. We evaluate 
the effect of using a fair-value test GP carry scheme on the present value of GP carried interest 
relative  to  other  carry  schemes.  We  find  that,  while  the  use  of  the  fair-value  test  has  a 
significantly positive effect on the PV of carry relative to other commonly used carry schemes, 
GPs gain only a marginal increase in their expected PV of carry by reporting inflated values for 
the un-exited (and therefore illiquid) investments remaining in their fund portfolios. Our findings 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""" "
10  See Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), Figure 4 (p.2334).     !*"
suggest that the fair-value test scheme is a favorable compensation scheme for GPs, but should 
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Table 1. Parameter values for the simulation model   
 
This  table  describes  (i)  the  default  parameter  values  used  in  the  baseline  simulation  model  and  (ii) 
variations considered for sensitivity analysis. Panel A presents the parameter values chosen for the VC 
model; Panel B presents the values for the BO model. In the baseline model, a VC (BO) fund makes 25 
(11) investments of equal sizes at the pace of 8, 6, 7, 3, and 1 (3, 3, 3, 1, and 1) investment(s) at the 
beginning of each of the first 5 years, respectively. The investment pace follows the empirically observed 
average investment pace as discussed in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a). From the time of the investment, 
each portfolio company is assumed to have the instantaneous hazard rate (= death rate, or exit probability) 
of 20%, independently with respect to any other portfolio companies. The market value of portfolio 
company i at time t,  , is assumed to follow 
,
 where the default 
risk-free rate (r) is 5%, the volatility (!) is 90% (60% for BO), and the pairwise correlation (= !
2) is 50% 
(20% for BO). For a given carry scheme, the default carry level is 20%, the carry basis is $100, the 
threshold level for the fair-value test is 120%, and the reported value of un-exited investments is 100% of 
the actual value (that is privately observed/assessed by GPs). For the baseline BO model, the leverage 
ratio of 2:1 is also assumed. While the carry level and basis determine the nominal amount of carry that 
GPs are entitled to, the fair-value threshold level and the ratio of reported to actual values of un-exited 
investments determine the carry timing.     








F ( )  #!"
Baseline model Variation considered
Exit probability 20% 10%, 30%
Carry level 20% 25%, 30%
Carry basis  $100 $82 (investment capital)
Total volatility of an investment  90% 60%, 120%
Pairwise correlation 50% 30%, 70%
Fair-value threshold level 120% 112%, 125%, 130%
Inflated value of un-exited investments  100% 125%, 150%
Exit probability 20% 10%, 30%
Carry level 20% 25%, 30%
Carry basis  $100 $88 (investment capital)
Total volatility of an investment  60% 30%, 90%
Pairwise correlation 20% 10%, 50%
Fair-value threshold level 120% 112%, 125%, 130%
Inflated value of un-exited investments  100% 125%, 150%
Leverage 2:1 1:1, 4:1
Panel B: Buyout Funds
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Table 2. Baseline model results   
 
This  table  presents  the  simulation  results  of  calculating  the  expected  PV  of  carry  for  the  three 
representative funds. Panel A presents the PV of carry per $100 of committed capital for VC funds; Panel 
B presents the results for BO funds. The parameter values for the baseline VC (BO) model are: 20% exit 
probability, 20% carry level, $100 carry basis (= committed capital), 90% (60%) total volatilities, 50% 
(20%) pairwise correlation, and 120% fair-value threshold level (plus 2:1 leverage ratio for BO). For the 
VC  model,  the  most  common  fund  (Fund  I)  requires  that,  upon  any  exit,  LPs  must  have  received 
cumulative exit distributions equal to the contributed capital (= cost bases of all investments made to date 
+ cumulative management fees paid to date) before any distribution of carried interests to GPs is allowed. 
For the BO model, the most common fund (Fund I) requires that, upon any exit, LPs must have received 
cumulative exit distributions equal to the contributed capital (= cost bases of all investments made to date 
+ cumulative management fees paid to date), plus 8% hurdle return, before any distribution of carried 
interests to GPs is allowed. GPs then catch up with LPs with the catch-up rate of 100%. For both the VC 
and BO model, the “no early carry” fund (Fund II) requires that, upon any exit, LPs must have received 
cumulative exit distributions equal to the committed capital before any distribution of carried interests to 
GPs is allowed. For both the VC and BO model, the FVT fund (Fund III) requires that, upon any exit, (i) 
LPs must have first received the cost bases of all exited (and written off) companies to date plus prorated 
management fees and (ii) the fair-value test (FVT) is met before any distribution of carried interests to 
GPs  is  allowed.  The  fair-value  test  requires  that  the  fair  value  (=  estimated,  reported  value)  of  the 
remaining fund portfolio companies equals or exceeds 120% of the cost bases of all un-exited investments. 
If the first criterion is met but there is a small deficit between the fair value of the remaining fund 
portfolio and the threshold value, the remaining exit value can be used to pay down the deficit so that the 





No early carry 
(Fund II)




Panel A: Venture Capital Funds
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Table 3. The Effect of Carry Timing Rules on PV of Carry 
 
This table presents the simulation results for the PVs of carried interest (in $, per $100 of committed 
capital)  as  functions  of  carry  timing  rules  and  the  level  of  the  risk-free  rate.  PVs  of  GP  carry  are 
calculated for three different fund terms: “Fund I: with no hurdle, contributed capital returned first with 
clawback” is a fund whose VC GPs are entitled to carry after returning the contributed capital to LP, 
subject to clawback. “Fund II: with no early carry” is a fund whose GPs must return all of carry basis 
before they are entitled to carry, thus ruling out any necessity for clawback. “Fund III: with a 120% 
threshold fair-value test, with clawback” is a fund whose GPs are entitled to carry after returning the cost 
basis of all exited (or written-off) investments and meeting the 120% fair-value test criteria for un-exited 













5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0%
Fund I: with no hurdle, contributed capital returned first with clawback
Present value of GP carry before clawback 8.77 8.75 8.72 8.69 8.66 8.63
Present value of the clawback 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
Present value of GP carry (net of clawback) 8.67 8.64 8.61 8.57 8.53 8.49
Fund II: with no early carry 
Present value of GP carry 8.61 8.59 8.57 8.55 8.52 8.49
Fund III: with a 120% threshold fair-value test, with clawback
Present value of GP carry before clawback 10.25 10.21 10.15 10.09 10.03 9.97
Present value of the clawback 0.84 0.94 1.05 1.18 1.32 1.48
Present value of GP carry (net of clawback) 9.42 9.27 9.10 8.91 8.71 8.49
Risk-Free Rate  #%"
Table 4. The Effect of Inflated (Reported) Values of Un-exited Investments on the PVs of Carry 
 
This table presents the simulation results for the PVs of GP carry as a function of the ratio of reported to 
actual values (that are privately observed/assessed by GPs) of un-exited investments. The actual portfolio 
values of un-exited investments are generated by the stochastic process as described in Equation (1). For 
the baseline model, the reported value is 100% of the actual value (no inflation). For the results in the last 
two columns, the reported values are assumed to be inflated by 25% and 50%, respectively, from the 




   
 
100% 125% 150%
Fund III: with a fair-value test, with clawback
Present value of GP carry before clawback 10.25 10.40 10.48
Present value of the clawback 0.84 0.93 0.98
Present value of GP carry (net of clawback) 9.42 9.48 9.51
Fund III: with a fair-value test, with clawback
Present value of GP carry before clawback 6.61 6.85 7.01
Present value of the clawback 0.43 0.57 0.67
Present value of GP carry (net of clawback) 6.18 6.28 6.34
Panel B: buyout funds
Inflation Level of                                    
Un-exited Investments 
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Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
This table presents the effects of altering the parameter values of the simulation model on the estimated 
PV of carry. Fund I for the VC model (BO model) is a fund with no hurdle (8% hurdle), contributed 
capital returned first with clawback. Fund II is a fund with committed capital returned first. Fund III is a 
fund with a fair-value test and with clawback. The baseline model refers to the model results reported in 
Table 2. “10% exit probability” refers to an altered model that is the same as the baseline model, except 
that the exit probability is set to 10% (instead of 20%). “30% exit probability” is similarly defined. “25% 
carry level” refers to an altered model that is the same as the baseline model except that the carry level is 
set to 25%. “30% carry level” is similarly defined. “Investment capital basis” refers to an altered model 
that is the same as the baseline model except that the carry basis is investment capital (which is set to $82 
($88 for BO) per $100 of committed capital). “60% volatility” refers to an altered model that is the same 
as the baseline model except that the annual volatility of individual investments is set to 60%. “120% 
volatility” is similarly defined. “30% pairwise correlation” is an altered model that is the same as the 
baseline model except that the pairwise correlation between individual investments is set to 30%. “70% 
pairwise correlation” is similarly defined. “112% fair-value test threshold” is an altered model that is the 
same as the baseline model except that the threshold level for the fair-value test is set to 112%. “125% 




No early carry 
(Fund II)
FVT   
(Fund III)
Baseline model 8.67 8.61 9.42
10% exit probability 11.43 11.41 12.17
30% exit probability  7.43 7.32 8.06
25% carry level 10.84 10.76 11.77
30% carry level 13.00 12.92 14.13
Investment capital basis 9.74 9.65 10.60
60% volatility 6.78 6.76 7.55
120% volatility 9.55 9.45 10.24
30% pairwise correlation  7.93 7.88 8.66
70% pairwise correlation  9.42 9.35 10.16
112% fair-value threshold level 9.44
125% fair-value threshold level 9.41
130% fair-value threshold level 9.39
Panel A: Venture Capital Funds




No early carry 
(Fund II)
FVT   
(Fund III)
Baseline model 5.04 5.60 6.18
10% exit probability 6.50 7.46 8.04
30% exit probability  4.03 4.41 4.90
25% carry level 6.27 7.00 7.72
30% carry level 7.49 8.40 9.27
Investment capital basis 5.98 6.49 7.23
30% volatility 2.65 4.01 4.54
90% volatility 7.20 7.40 7.98
10% pairwise correlation 4.84 5.46 6.01
50% pairwise correlation  5.66 6.11 6.74
112% fair-value threshold level 6.21
125% fair-value threshold level 6.16
130% fair-value threshold level 6.14
1:1 leverage 5.16 5.73 6.31
4:1 leverage 4.80 5.35 5.91











   